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IDENTITY CRISIS: UNITED STATES V.
HIIBEL AND THE CONTINUED EROSION
OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
Beth Rosenblum*
I. INTRODUCTION
Compelled identification statutes exist in more than twenty states and
United States territories.1 Nevada's "stop and identify" provision is chapter
171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS), which provides:
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is commit-
ting or is about to commit a crime.
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his
identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any per-
son so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other
inquiry of any peace officer.
2
In some states, a person who refuses to reveal his identity to police is
charged with a misdemeanor or civil violation, while other states consider the
refusal as a factor in whether a suspect violated loitering laws.3 These com-
pelled identification laws have their roots in English vagrancy statutes that
required vagrants to provide "a good account of themselves" or face arrest.4
Until recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized constitutional
limitations on these laws, holding that compelled identification statutes similar
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1 E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(3) (Michie 2004);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6)
(2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021(2) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2004); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) (2004); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 84.710(2) (2004); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46 -5- 401( 2)(A) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123
(2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3 (2004);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2004); N.D. CEr. CODE § 29-29-21
(2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2004); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 1983 (2004); Wis. STAT. § 968.24 (2004).
2 NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2004).
3 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2456 (2004).
4 Id. at 2457 (quoting 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744)).
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to Nevada's were either void for vagueness or so arbitrary that they posed too
great a risk for abusive police practices to withstand constitutionality. 5 How-
ever, until it heard Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court in early 2004, the
Court had declined to address whether persons could be punished for refusing
to identify themselves during stops for reasonable suspicion.6
Larry Hiibel was convicted pursuant to NRS 171.123 and 199.28W7 after
he refused to give his name during a roadside investigation for domestic bat-
tery.8 The Nevada Supreme Court upheld his conviction, declaring that the
statute was "a commonsense requirement necessary to protect both the public
and law enforcement officers . . . consistent with the Fourth Amendment." 9
Remarkably, just ten months prior to the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board,
held that NRS 171.123 was an "egregious" violation of the Fourth
Amendment.'°
In light of this split of authority, the United States Supreme Court granted
Hiibel's petition to review the Nevada Supreme Court's decision."' However,
in a departure from decades of precedent, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Nevada statute.' 2 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court declared that the arrest of Hiibel pursuant to NRS 171.123 did not violate
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 3 The Court also held that Hiibel's conviction for refusing to identify
himself did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
1 4
Like the Nevada Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court determined
that requiring suspects to reveal their identification is "a commonsense
inquiry."' 5
This note argues that compelled identification statutes like NRS 171.123
are anything but commonsense. Part Two of this note details the case history
of the Hiibel decision. Part Three sets forth the relevant Fourth Amendment
case law dealing with privacy and questioning during police stops, followed in
Part Four by an explanation of cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment's appli-
cation to compulsory identification requirements. Finally, Part Five analyzes
5 E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52
(1979); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
6 Brown, 443 U.S. at 53 n.3; Kolender, 461 U.S. at 362 n.10; Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2451.
7 NEV. REV. STAT. 199.280 (2003) provides:
A person who, in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise specially provided for,
willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any
legal duty of his office shall be punished:
2. Where no dangerous weapon is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, for
a misdemeanor.
8 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), cert. granted, 540
U.S. 965 (2003).
9 Id. at 1207.
50 Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
'' Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 430 (2003).
12 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004).
13 Id. at 2460.
14 Id. at 2461.
15 Id. at 2460.
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how the United States Supreme Court erred in holding compelled identification
statutes constitutional.
II. HIBEL CASE HISTORY
A. Factual Background
On May 21, 2000, Humboldt County Sheriffs Deputy Lee Dove
responded to a call that a man was striking a female passenger in a red and
silver truck along Grass Valley Road in rural, north-central Nevada.16 , Upon
arriving at the scene, Dove spoke with the caller, who pointed to a vehicle
parked alongside the road. 17 Dove approached the truck and noticed skid
marks in the gravel, suggesting the truck was parked abruptly. 18 He then spot-
ted Larry Hiibel outside the truck and Hiibel's minor daughter sitting inside the
vehicle. 9 Based on Hiibel's speech, odor and mannerisms, Dove believed that
Hiibel was intoxicated. 20 Dove asked Hiibel for identification, but Hiibel
refused.21 Hiibel placed his hands behind his back, challenging Dove to arrest
him because "he did not believe he had done anything wrong. 2 2 Dove later
reported that Hiibel became "aggressive and moody."2 a After eleven requests
for identification, Dove arrested Hiibel.2 4 While Dove could not determine
whether Hiibel had committed a crime, Dove "put him in handcuffs so [Dove]
could secure him for [Dove's] safety. 2 5
Hiibel was charged with and found guilty of resisting an officer in viola-
tion of NRS 199.280.26 Prosecutors dropped a domestic battery charge and
never charged Hiibel with public intoxication or driving under the influence of
alcohol.2 7 On appeal, the district court affirmed Hiibel's conviction as "reason-
able and necessary," holding that it is crucial for officers and possible victims
to know the identity of persons suspected of domestic violence and driving
under the influence. 28 Hiibel appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of NRS 171.123.29
B. The Nevada Supreme Court Decision
Writing for the majority, Justice Cliff Young acknowledged the impor-
tance of wandering freely in society without being compelled to reveal one's
identity.30 Nevertheless, he wrote that the right to privacy is not absolute, but
16 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. 199.280 (2003).
27 Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
28 Id. at 1203-04.
29 Id. at 1204.
30 Id.
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limited by reasonableness. 31 The majority concluded that the public interest in
requiring persons to identify themselves to police when reasonable suspicion
exists is "overwhelming. 32 To support this conclusion, the majority pointed to
increased threats from terrorism, school shootings and statistics regarding vio-
lence against officers.33 Knowing a suspect's identity, argued the majority,
allows officers to evaluate and predict such dangers.3 4
Moreover, the court stated that NRS 171.123 involves a minimum inva-
sion of privacy, far less than a pat-down frisk.3 A name is "neutral and non-
incriminating information," and reasonable people do not withhold their identi-
ties from officers as Hiibel did.36 Rather, individuals willingly give their
names when meeting new acquaintances or giving out business cards, credit
cards, checks, and driver's licenses.37 Furthermore, the majority explained that
NRS 171.123 applies only in situations where officers reasonably suspect and
can articulate their suspicion that a person has engaged in criminal behavior.3 8
Justice A. William Maupin's brief concurrence further stressed the narrow
application of the statute, and emphasized the need to protect police and the
public in light of the war against terrorism.
39
Justices Deborah A. Agosti, Miriam Shearing and Robert E. Rose rejected
the majority's analysis, arguing that it abandoned the fundamental right to pri-
vacy by requiring persons to identify themselves or face arrest. 40 The dissent
reiterated the limited holding of Terry v. Ohio,41 which allows police to pat
down persons for weapons, but not to detect wallets and remove them to be
searched.42 With the majority decision, an officer could now "figuratively,
reach in, grab the wallet and pull out the detainee's identification. 4 3 The dis-
sent also attacked the majority's use of statistics about police fatalities, arguing
that they did not support the assertion that an officer is better protected from
violence by knowing a suspect's identity.44 In the view of the dissenting jus-
tices, the majority failed to recognize that officers investigating crimes must
rely on the observable conduct of a person, not his identity.4 5 Moreover, situa-
tions in which persons voluntarily give their names when meeting new
acquaintances or business associates are distinguishable from situations in
which police force persons to identify themselves or face arrest.4 6 The latter
are "the type of government intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1205 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
33 Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1205-06.
34 Id. at 1205.
35 Id. at 1206.
36 Id. at 1206-07.
37 Id. at 1206.
38 Id. at 1207.
31 Id. (Maupin, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 1207-08 (Agosti, J., dissenting).
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 23 (1968).
42 Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1209.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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to prevent."'47 Furthermore, the dissenting opinion argued that the majority
risked being "blinded by fear" with its argument about domestic terrorism.
48
For the dissent, the true test of the nation's courage in these times is "our neces-
sary and steadfast resolve to protect and safeguard the rights and principals
upon which our nation was founded, our constitution and personal liberties.
49
Notably, the dissenting opinion relied on Carey v. Nevada Gaming Con-
trol Board, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision issued ten months earlier
that also addressed the constitutionality of NRS 171.123.50 James Carey
refused to identify himself to a Gaming Control Board Agent who suspected
him of illegal card counting at a Laughlin, Nevada casino. 51 Even though the
agent determined that there was no probable cause to arrest Carey for cheating,
he arrested Carey pursuant to NRS 171.123 and 197.19052 for not revealing his
name.53 Carey was never charged, but he alleged that the agent, the state of
Nevada and the Gaming Control Board violated his Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment rights by compelling him to identify himself to police during a lawful
investigatory detention.54 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Carey, determining
that laws like NRS 171.123 "bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than prob-
able cause, and the serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere
possibility that identification might provide a link leading to arrest."'55 The
Hiibel minority agreed, finding the Ninth Circuit's approach "more lucid."56 In
contrast and without elaborating as to its own reasoning, the Hiibel majority
proclaimed the Carey decision was "unpersuasive.""
In response to the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, Hiibel filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, requesting
consideration of the question of whether NRS 171.123 violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. The Court granted Hiibel's petition in late 2003.58 Finally,
after decades of avoiding the issue, the United States Supreme Court was ready
to address whether the constitution permits state law to punish persons for
refusing to identify themselves during lawful police stops.
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
Justice Anthony Kennedy began the majority decision by acknowledging
the limits on "stop and identify" statutes imposed by the Court for stops based
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1210.
49 Id.
50 Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002).
51 Id. at 876.
52 NEV. REv. STAT. 197.190 (2003) provides:
Every person who, after due notice, shall refuse or neglect to make or furnish any statement,
report or information lawfully required of him by any public officer ... or who shall willfully
hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of his official powers or duties, shall,
where no other provision of law applies, be guilty of a misdemeanor.
13 Carey, 279 F.3d at 876.
54 Id.
15 Id. at 880 (quoting Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1981)).
56 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1208 n.6 (Nev. 2002), cert granted,
540 U.S. 965 (2003) (Agosti, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 1204.
58 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 430 (2003).
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on less than reasonable suspicion.59 However, the fact that Deputy Dove had
reasonable suspicion to question Hiibel distinguished his stop from those prior
cases.6" Moreover, the Nevada statute is narrower than similar statutes that
were held unconstitutionally vague because NRS 171.123 requires suspects to
give officers only their names, not their drivers' licenses or other documents.61
As for Hiibel's Fourth Amendment argument, the majority stated that the
right to question suspects is essential to police investigations, and officers are
free to ask for identification as long as they have reasonable suspicion.6 2 In
fact, questions about a suspect's identity are routine in Terry stops and serve
important government interests.63 Justice Kennedy wrote:
Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another
offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing
identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts
elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such as this, where the
police are investigating what appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to
investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to
assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim.
64
Still, while officers may ask suspects for their identity, the majority
acknowledged that its prior decisions had left open the question of whether
suspects may be arrested and prosecuted for refusing to answer.65 Although
Hiibel argued that dicta from earlier decisions supported his argument against
prosecution, the Court rejected his argument and stated that it "do[es] not read
these statements as controlling."66 Instead, the Court explained, those state-
ments recognized that the Fourth Amendment cannot require suspects to
answer questions.67 State law, however, may impose such requirements, and
here, the source of the legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the
United States Constitution.68 The majority stated that NRS 171.123 satisfied
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test, which balances Hiibel's right to
privacy against the government's interests, because the request for identifica-
tion had an immediate relation to the purpose and demands of a Terry stop.
69
The majority also rejected Hiibel's argument that NRS 171.123 circumvents
the probable cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for
being suspicious, thereby creating a risk for arbitrary police enforcement.70
That concern, the Court said, is alleviated by the requirement that a Terry stop
59 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2457 (2004) (citing Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)).
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2458.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2459.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the initial stop.7 1
Here, the request for Hiibel's identity was a "commonsense" inquiry, not an
effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify oneself after a Terry stop yielded
insufficient evidence.72
The majority opinion next addressed Hiibel's argument that his conviction
violated the Fifth Amendment by forcing him to make disclosures that were
testimonial, incriminating and compelled.73 While the majority agreed that
stating one's name may qualify as testimonial, the Court concluded that
revealing Hiibel's name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.74
Justice Kennedy wrote:
Petitioner's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and
appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it "would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" him. As best as we can
tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none
of the officer's business.
75
Furthermore, the majority suggested that answering a request to disclose
one's name is likely incriminating only in unusual circumstances.76 Although
the majority recognized Hiibel's belief that he should not be compelled to dis-
close his identity, the Fifth Amendment cannot override the Nevada Legisla-
ture's judgment without a reasonable belief by Hiibel that the disclosure would
incriminate him.
77
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion, expressing their disa-
greement in two separate opinions based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination is not as narrow as the majority or the Nevada
statute suggest. 78  Justice Stevens stated that the constitutional privilege
extends beyond criminal court proceedings to Terry stops, and there was no
reason why the subject of an interrogation based on mere suspicion should have
less protection than a suspect detained for probable cause.7 9 Thus, because a
detainee is not obligated to respond to an officer's questions during a Terry
stop, there is no reason that the suspect must disclose his identity.8 0 In addi-
tion, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for declining to resolve the question
of whether Hiibel's compelled communication was testimonial.8" He explained
that Hiibel's statement, made during a Terry stop, qualified as an interrogation
and therefore was testimonial in nature.8 2 Moreover, Justice Stevens disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the state can compel disclosure of one's
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2460.
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 2461 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2462-63.
81 Id. at 2463.
82 Id.
[Vol. 5:798
IDENTITY CRISIS
identity because it is not incriminating. 83 The Fifth Amendment protects com-
pelled testimony that communicates information that may lead to incriminating
evidence, and revealing Hiibel's name could provide such a link.84 Otherwise,
Justice Stevens reasoned that the Nevada Legislature would have no reason to
require disclosure in circumstances that reasonably indicate that a person is
committing or is about to commit a crime.85 Furthermore, if Hiibel's name
would not be used as a link to prosecute him, then the refusal to reveal his
name could not impede the police investigation. 86 Thus, Justice Stevens stated
that "[a] person's identity obviously bears informational and incriminating
worth," and Hiibel acted within his rights by choosing not to reveal his name.
87
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices
David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, focused on the Fourth Amendment's
invalidation of laws that compel responses to police questions.88 The dissent
cited dicta from past Court decisions that stated when persons are stopped for
reasonable suspicion, they are not compelled to answer questions put to them.
89
In Justice Breyer's opinion, "[t]here is no good reason now to reject this gener-
ation-old statement of the law."90 He also expressed concern that states could
require individuals to answer questions about their licenses or their addresses,
which could provide police with incriminating evidence under the right circum-
stances.91 In Justice Breyer's opinion, the majority presented no evidence that
withholding a name significantly interfered with law enforcement. 92
The Court's opinion in Hiibel is surprising, given the overwhelming
Fourth and Fifth Amendment precedent explicitly rejecting stop and identify
statutes like NRS 171.123. These earlier cases suggest that the Hiibel outcome
is not as "commonsense" as the majority would like to believe.
III. FouRTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The following cases demonstrate the United States Supreme
Court's general disapproval of laws that force persons to relinquish their expec-
tation of privacy and give their names to police during investigatory stops.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2463-64.
85 Id. at 2464.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2464-65.
89 Id. at 2465 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring)); Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3 (1979); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2465-66.
92 Id. at 2466.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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A. Katz v. United States
In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established the
predominant test for determining whether an expectation of privacy is reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment.9 4 Katz was charged with transmitting
wagering information by telephone across interstate lines, in violation of a fed-
eral statute.9 5 At trial, the government introduced evidence of Katz's telephone
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who attached an electronic listening
and recording device to the public telephone booth from which Katz placed his
calls.96 Katz was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed the verdict,
rejecting Katz's argument that the recordings violated his Fourth Amendment
right to privacy.9 7
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the government's activi-
ties constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment, but declined to decide whether the public telephone booth was a
"constitutionally protected area."9 8 Instead, the Court asserted that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. 99 The recording was unconstitutional
not because of a physical trespass, but because it infringed upon Katz's reason-
able expectation of privacy." ° The majority stated that Katz was entitled to
assume that once he closed the door of the phone booth, his conversation would
not be broadcast to the world. 1 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan enunciated
a two-part test for determining whether a person is entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.12 First, a person must exhibit an actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. 0 3 Second, that expectation must be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. 1° 4 This test laid the groundwork for sub-
sequent Fourth Amendment privacy cases.
B. Terry v. Ohio
The seminal 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio examined the role of the Fourth
Amendment in confrontations between police and citizens on the street.
10 5
Terry and two others were stopped after a detective observed them "casing" a
store for a robbery.10 6 Believing the men had weapons, the detective' patted
down their clothes and felt a gun inside Terry's coat.10 7 The trial court held
94 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51, 361 (1967).
95 Id. at 348; (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) ("Whoever being engaged in the business of bet-
ting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in inter-
state or foreign commerce of bets or wagers . . . shall be fined no more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.")).
96 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
97 Id. at 348-49.
98 Id. at 350.
99 Id. at 351.
100 Id. at 352-53.
101 Id. at 352.
102 Id. at 361.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
106 Id. at 6.
107 Id. at 7.
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that the "frisk" was essential to the detective's investigation and convicted
Terry of carrying a concealed weapon.' 0 8 The Ohio Supreme Court denied
Terry's appeal, stating that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to Terry's
situation.'09
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Terry's conviction but dis-
agreed that the Fourth Amendment did not apply." 0 Rejecting the idea that a
"frisk" is less than a stop and outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court declared that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.""'1 Thus,
Terry was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.' 12 However, the search of
Terry's coat was constitutionally reasonable.l 3 The Court stated that reasona-
bleness could be determined only by balancing the officer's need to search or
seize against the scope of the invasion upon the individual. 1 4 The detective
suspected that Terry was armed and dangerous, and he did not invade Terry's
person beyond the outside of his clothes." 5 Still, the Court limited its holding
to circumstances in which an officer can "reasonably conclude in light of his
experience that ... the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous ... 116
In his concurrence, Justice White added these significant words about
police encounters:
There is nothing in the Constitution 'which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person
approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his
way. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to
me the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are
directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it
may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.
1 17
The Court adopted Justice White's opinion a decade later, in Dunaway v. New
york. 18
C. Dunaway v. New York
In 1971, Rochester, New York police took Dunaway into custody after an
informant implicated him in a robbery and murder." 9 Dunaway was not
arrested but held in an interrogation room, where he made incriminating state-
ments and drawings.' 2 o The trial court denied a motion to suppress the state-
108 Id. at 8.
109 Id.
110 See id. at 16.
"I Id.
112 Id,
113 See id. at 28.
114 Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
115 Id. at 29-30.
116 Id. at 30.
117 Id. at 34.
118 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211 (1979).
119 Id. at 202.
120 Id. at 203.
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ments and sketches, and Dunaway was convicted. 12  He appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which vacated the conviction and remanded the
case for further consideration. 122
Upon second hearing, the United States Supreme Court held that police
had seized Dunaway in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 123 Quoting Justice
White's Terry concurrence, the Court recognized that persons detained pursu-
ant to Terry cannot be compelled to answer questions.1 24 The Court then ana-
lyzed whether Terry applied to the custodial interrogation of Dunaway.1 25
Because the frisk in Terry fell far short of the intrusion associated with an
arrest, the Court applied a balancing test rather than determining if the officer
had probable cause. 126 In contrast to Terry, Dunaway's detention was indistin-
guishable from a traditional arrest. Accordingly, the Court held that the deten-
tion was unreasonable because police lacked probable cause and only took
Dunaway into custody to find evidence. 127
D. Brown v. Texas
The United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. Texas in the same
term as Dunaway.128 El Paso, Texas police stopped Brown in a known drug-
trafficking area, although the officers did not suspect that he had committed a
crime or was carrying a weapon. 129 When Brown refused to identify himself,
he was arrested and later convicted pursuant to section 38.02(a) of the Texas
Penal Code, which provided that "[a] person commits an offense if he inten-
tionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence
address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the
information."130 The El Paso County Court denied Brown's constitutional
appeal. 131
However, a unanimous Court132 found that the application of section
38.02(a) to Brown violated the Fourth Amendment because police lacked a
reasonable basis for his arrest. 13 3 The Court recognized the legitimacy of sec-
tion 38.02(a) to prevent crime but stated that police could not demand identifi-
cation from persons without believing that they had engaged in criminal
activity. 134 Without such suspicion, the balance between public interest and
individual privacy favors freedom from police interference. 135 Still, the Court
121 Id.
122 Id. at 204 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053 (1975)).
123 Id. at 207.
124 Id. at 211 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)).
125 Id. at 211-13.
126 Id. at 209 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-27).
127 Id. at 212, 218.
128 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
129 Id. at 49.
130 Id. (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974)).
131 Id. at 49-50.
132 Id. at 50. The rejection of Brown's constitutional claim by the El Paso County Court
was a decision by the highest court in the state, giving the United States Supreme Court
proper jurisdiction. Id.
133 See id. at 52.
134 See id.
135 Id.
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did not consider whether persons should be punished for refusing to identify
themselves during lawful stops.' 36
E. Kolender v. Lawson
In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court considered a facial challenge to section
647(e) of the California Penal Code.' 37 The statute provided:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct
... (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without appar-
ent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his
presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circum-
stances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands
such identification.
1 38
As interpreted by the California courts, section 647(e) required persons to
show "credible and reliable" identification that carried some reasonable assur-
ance of authenticity and provided police with sufficient contact information.
139
Between 1975 and 1977, Edward Lawson was arrested approximately fif-
teen times for violating section 647(e), but he was prosecuted only twice and
convicted once. 4 On at least two occasions, the officers who arrested Lawson
requested identification because Lawson was loitering in areas known for their
criminal activity."' After his conviction, Lawson filed a civil lawsuit, arguing
that section 647(e) violated the Fourth Amendment.' 4 2 Both the District Court
for the Southern District of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held the statute unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
1 43
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that
section 647(e) as drafted contained no standard for determining how a suspect
satisfied the requirement to provide credible and reliable information."4 As a
result, the law allowed for arbitrary police enforcement by vesting "virtually
complete discretion in the hands of police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of
probable cause to arrest."1 45 Notably, the Court rejected the state's argument
that the statute provided a necessary tool to law enforcement to combat "the
epidemic of crime that plagues our Nation."' 146 The majority acknowledged the
merit of the state's concern, but stated it could not justify legislation that did
not meet constitutional standards. 14 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan added
that the Fourth Amendment also prohibited enforcement of the statute.'
48
136 Id. at 53.
137 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
138 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970).
139 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356-57.
140 Id. at 354.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 354-55.
144 Id. at 358.
145 Id. at 358-59.
146 Id. at 361.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 369.
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Using language similar to Justice White's Terry concurrence, Justice Brennan
argued that states could not abridge the Constitution by punishing persons who
refused to answer questions during lawful stops.14 9
F. Berkemer v. McCarty
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States Supreme Court considered the
application of a Fifth Amendment doctrine to Fourth Amendment Terry
stops.15 ° Specifically, the Court decided whether the warnings prescribed by
Miranda v. Arizona 5 ' apply to the context of a routine traffic stop. 52 An
Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper stopped Richard McCarty for driving errati-
cally, and while questioning McCarty, determined that he was under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol.'5 3 The trooper told McCarty that he could not leave
the scene but did not indicate that McCarty was under arrest. 154 The trooper
then took McCarty to the station house, where McCarty made incriminating
statements to officers during an interrogation. 55 However, the police never
informed McCarty of his Miranda rights. 15 6 McCarty was subsequently con-
victed of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of marijuana. 157
The United States Supreme Court ultimately rejected McCarty's argument
that the trooper violated his rights by not issuing Miranda warnings during the
roadside interrogation. 158 However, the Court used the decision to clarify the
authority of police when conducting Terry stops.' 59 Justice Marshall, joined by
seven other justices, explained that officers may detain persons briefly to
"investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion."1 60 In other words:
The stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation .... Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate
number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information con-
firming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the detainee is not obligated to
respond. And, unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause
to arrest him, he must then be released.
161
This "nonthreatening" and "noncoercive" aspect of Terry stops supported
Justice Marshall's conclusion that police need not give Miranda warnings dur-
ing such detentions.' 6 2
149 Id. at 366-67.
150 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
"I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (advising that police must warn suspects
that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can and will be used against
them in court, that they have the right to an attorney; and that if they cannot afford counsel, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent them).
152 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 424.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 441-42.
159 See id. at 439-40.
160 Id. at 439 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)).
161 Id. at 439-40.
162 Id. at 440.
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The decisions from Terry to Berkemer illustrate the Court's view that
compelled identification laws wrongly allow police to make arrests on less than
probable cause and in violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Other cases demonstrate that these laws
also violate a person's self-incrimination rights protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 163
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
The Fifth Amendment provides that persons shall not be compelled to be
witnesses against themselves in criminal proceedings.16 In the following
cases, the United States Supreme Court articulated a standard for determining
whether compelled disclosure statutes violate this constitutional protection.
165
A. California v. Byers
In California v. Byers, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of section 20002 of the California Vehicle Code, which
requires drivers involved in car accidents that damage property or another vehi-
cle to stop and leave their names and addresses.16 6 Byers was charged with
violating the statute after a 1966 hit-and-run accident. 167 However, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the statute violated Byers's privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination.
168
The Court reversed, holding that the question of whether the government
infringed upon the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination must be
resolved by balancing the public need against the individual's claim to constitu-
tional protection. 169 The 5-4 majority ultimately decided that the public need
for disclosure outweighed ah individual's protection against self-incrimination,
by considering the following two factors: whether there is a substantial hazard
of self-incrimination; and whether the statement is testimonial in nature.' 70
1. Substantial Hazard of Self-Incrimination
To invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, an
individual must show that the compelled disclosure confronts the claimant with
"substantial hazards of self-incrimination." 171 This is more than a mere possi-
bility of incrimination because it might require an admission of a crucial ele-
163 See discussion infra Part IV.
16' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
165 See Cal. v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429-34 (1971).
166 Id. at 426. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (West 1971) provides that a driver "leave in
a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other property damaged a written notice giving the
name and address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle involved."
167 Byers v. Justice Court for the Ukiah Judicial Dist. of Mendocino Co., 458 P.2d 465, 467
(Cal. 1969).
168 Id. at 478.
169 Byers, 402 U.S. at 427.
170 See id. at 428-34.
171 Id. at 429.
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ment of the crime. 172 The Court illustrated the substantial hazard test by
pointing to four cases from the 1960s.17
3
In Albertson v. SACB, the Court held that an order requiring registration
by individual members of the Communist Party violated the privilege against
self-incrimination. 174 Three years later, in Marchetti v. United States and
Grosso v. United States, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment provided a
complete defense to not complying with federal gambling tax and registration
requirements. 7 5 Finally, in Haynes v. United States, the Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination protected Haynes from prosecution for not
registering a firearm as required by federal statute. 176 In these four cases, com-
pliance with the statutory disclosure requirement confronted the person with the
substantial hazard of self-incrimination because:
The disclosures condemned were only those extracted from a "highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities" and the privilege was applied only in "an
area permeated with criminal statutes" - not in an "essentially non-criminal and regu-
latory area of inquiry."
177
In contrast, the Byers Court explained that the California Vehicle Code is
regulatory, not criminal, because its intent is to resolve civil liabilities resulting
from car accidents, not to facilitate convictions.' 78 Moreover, the section of the
code in question is not directed at a "highly selective group" but at all Califor-
nia drivers, a group numbering in the millions. 179
2. Testimonial in Nature
Additionally, the Byers Court explained that individuals invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must demonstrate that the
compelled disclosure is testimonial in nature.' 80 Testimonial or communica-
tive evidence is distinguishable from real, physical evidence. 8' In Schmerber
v. California, the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment protects against com-
pelled communications but does not bar the admission of tangible evidence at
trial. "'82 Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment did not require suppressing blood
taken from Schmerber while he was hospitalized after a car accident, nor did it
exclude the subsequent chemical analysis that determined Schmerber was
intoxicated while driving. 183
Applying the Schmerber standard, the Byers Court determined that the
requirements of the section of the code did not provide evidence of a testimo-
172 Id. at 428.
173 See id. at 429.
114 Albertson v. SACB, 328 U.S. 70, 86 (1965).
171 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62, 70 (1968).
176 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 101 (1968).
177 Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47.
178 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
179 Id.
18o See id. at 431-32.
181 See id. at 432 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)).
182 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
183 Id. at 765.
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nial or communicative nature.18 4 The statute required a driver to stop at an
accident scene, an act no more testimonial than giving a sample of blood.' 85
The Court also rejected Byers's argument that because the duty to stop is
imposed only on the driver involved in the accident, complying with the statute
is testimonial because stopping leads to the inference that this driver was the
one who caused the accident.' 86 Such inferences are not testimonial, based on
earlier Court precedent. 187 Thus, the requirement that Byers give his name at
the scene was not incriminating under the circumstances.
1 88
B. Doe v. United States
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court expanded the definition of testi-
monial evidence in Doe v. United States.189 John Doe, the subject of a federal
grand jury investigation into fraud, invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination when questioned about the existence of banking
records.19° After three foreign banks refused to produce records, citing their
countries' privacy laws, the United States Government filed a motion to order
Doe to sign a consent that authorized the banks to release their records. 19' The
district court denied the order, but when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, the district court ordered Doe to sign.192 When Doe refused, he was
held in contempt of court.
19 3
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit and concluded
that the consent form did not violate Doe's Fifth Amendment rights because the
signature was not testimonial. 194 In making the determination, the Court clari-
fied the meaning of testimonial.1 95 To be testimonial, the Court stated that "an
accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual
assertion or disclose information."' 196 The consent directive did not force Doe
to admit that he possessed any bank accounts, nor did the form admit the
authenticity of any records produced by the banks. 197 Still, the Court acknowl-
edged that "there are very few instances in which a verbal statement, either oral
184 Byers, 402 U.S. at 432.
185 Id. at 431-32.
186 Id. at 433.
187 Id.; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). While conducting a lineup to
identify the suspect in a bank robbery, police compelled Wade to speak the words of the
perpetrator. Id. Despite the inference that Wade uttered the words in his normal voice, the
Court held that the utterances were not testimonial and thus not protected under the Fifth
Amendment, even though Wade's speaking led to his being identified as the robber. Id.
188 Byers, 402 U.S. at 434.
189 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
190 Id. at 202.
191 Id. at 203.
192 Id. at 205.
193 Id. at 205-06.
194 Id. at 219.
195 See id. at 207-14.
196 Id. at 210.
197 Id. at 215.
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or written, will not convey information or assert facts." 19 8 Thus, the majority
of verbal statements are testimonial and protected by the Fifth Amendment. 199
C. Pennsylvania v. Muniz
Two years after Doe, the Court considered Pennsylvania v. Muniz.20 0
Inocencio Muniz was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.2"'
Without being advised of his Miranda rights, Muniz answered several ques-
tions regarding his identity, including his name and address, on audio and
videotape.2 °2 Police also inquired about the date of Muniz's sixth birthday,
which he could not answer.20 3 The tapes showing Muniz inebriated were
admitted at trial, and he was convicted.2 "4 However, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the audiotapes should have been sup-
pressed because Muniz's statements were testimonial.20 5
The United States Supreme Court agreed that the answers to the questions
were incriminating, testimonial evidence.20 6 While the Court acknowledged
the state's assertion that the slurring of speech constituted physical evidence,
that did not end the inquiry. ° 7 Rather, the Court looked to the content of
Muniz's answers, which implied that his mental state was confused.20 8 The
incriminating inference did not come from physical evidence but from a testi-
monial act.209 The Court distinguished Muniz's situation from Schmerber,
concluding that if police had asked Schmerber if he was intoxicated rather than
taking his blood, his response would have been testimonial.210 The Court also
expanded on its holding in Doe:
The definition of "testimonial" evidence articulated in Doe must encompass all
responses to questions that, if asked of a sworn suspect during a criminal trial, could
place the suspect in the "cruel trilemma" .... Whenever a suspect is asked for a
response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or
belief, the suspect confronts the "trilemma" of truth, falsity or silence, and hence the
response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial component.2 11
Accordingly, the police question about the date of Muniz's birthday vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 12 The -coer-
cive environment of the police questioning precluded Muniz from remaining
198 Id. at 213.
'99 See id. at 213-14.
200 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
201 Id. at 585.
202 Id. at 585-86.
203 Id. at 586.
204 Id. at 587.
205 Id. at 587-88.
206 See id. at 590-600.
207 Id. at 590-92.
208 Id. at 592.
209 Id. at 593.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 597.
212 See id. at 598-600. The questions regarding Muniz's identity, while incriminating, fell
within the "routine booking question" exception, which allows for the admission of ques-
tions to secure biographical information necessary to complete booking. Id. at 601; United
States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 (8th Cir. 1989).
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silent, leaving him with the choice of incriminating himself by admitting he did
not know the date of his birthday or giving a false date to police.2 13 The con-
tent of Muniz' s truthful answer supported the inference that his mental capacity
was impaired.2 14
In conclusion, the Byers, Doe and Muniz decisions provided the United
States Supreme Court with a framework for determining whether compelled
identification statutes violate the Fifth Amendment. Unfortunately, the Hiibel
Court elected not to follow this history.
V. ANALYSIS
Decades of Fourth and Fifth Amendment precedent suggest that the out-
come in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court should be different. Although
not expressly stated by the majority opinion, it is likely that the recent climate
of terrorism and the lingering impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks signifi-
cantly affected the decision. In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court justified its
decision in Hiibel by arguing that NRS 171.123 was necessary to protect law
enforcement officers as well as the public during a time when "the dangers we
face as a nation are unparalleled. ' '215 Amici briefs submitted to the United
States Supreme Court in this case addressed concerns about the war on terror-
ism.216 It is also noteworthy that in the same term as Hiibel, the Court consid-
ered several cases involving the prosecution of enemy combatants and
suspected terrorists. 2 17 If the war on terrorism was a factor in the decision,
acknowledging its influence would at least explain why the majority decided to
ignore its past criticism of compelled identification statutes. Instead, the Court
relied on faulty logic to explain its rejection of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
case law.
A. The Decision is Inconsistent with Fourth Amendment Precedent
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, an arrest typically requires probable
cause.2 l8 However, compelled identification statutes such as NRS 171.123 cir-
cumvent this requirement and allow police to bootstrap the authority to arrest
on less than probable cause, a concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Carey v. Gaming Control Board.u19 Carey's name was inconse-
quential to determining whether he had cheated while gambling. Similarly,
Hiibel's identity did not provide any evidence that he had actually committed
domestic battery or was intoxicated. Based on the Hiibel majority's own
acknowledgment that an officer may not arrest a suspect "if the request for
213 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 599.
214 Id.
215 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002).
216 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, et al. at 12-16,
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554); Brief of Amicus
Curiae of John Gilmore at 9a, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004)
(No. 03-5554).
217 E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
218 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
219 Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2002).
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identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop,"
the police action against Hiibel contradicts the Court's holding.220
The Hiibel decision is also at odds with the Court's holding in Berkemer.
In that majority opinion, Justice Marshall wrote that if an officer asks questions
reasonably related to the circumstances provoking suspicion but does not
receive answers that provide the officer with probable cause to arrest, the
detainee must be released. 22' Deputy Dove's questions about Hiibel's name
did not meet this requirement because they did not relate to the circumstances
surrounding the initial investigation. Dove used Hiibel's refusal to provide his
identity as an excuse to arrest a person he felt was "aggressive and moody. 222
Deputy Dove lacked probable cause to arrest Hiibel for committing domestic
battery or even driving while intoxicated. On the authority of Berkemer, Dove
should have released Hiibel rather than arrest him for exercising the right to
keep his name private.
In fact, all citizens possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
names, as recognized in Katz v. United States. 223 There are numerous reasons
why persons choose not to give their names and to remain anonymous. Indi-
viduals learn not to reveal their names to strangers for safety reasons or to give
personal information to avoid identity theft. Persons also keep their names out
of phone books, choose to pay cash and not keep credit cards or checks, and
otherwise keep their names private unless they voluntarily elect to reveal
them.224 Larry Hiibel exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his own
name, which is why he did not think it necessary to reveal his identity to Dep-
uty Dove. The Hiibel majority criticized Hiibel for not having a reasonable
belief that the disclosure of his name would tend to incriminate him. 225 How-
ever, to hold that Hiibel's expectation of privacy was unreasonable is to ignore
the reality of modem police investigation. Officers have access to complex
government databases, and with just a name, they can learn intimate, incrimi-
nating details that are beyond the scope of a reasonable Terry stop.226
Moreover, United States Supreme Court precedent recognizes that the
Fourth Amendment protects persons subject to Terry stops from answering any
question put to them. In Dunaway, the Court adopted Justice White's Terry
concurrence, declaring that a person stopped under reasonable suspicion "is not
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer fur-
nishes no basis for arrest. '227 This protection, cited in subsequent Court deci-
220 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004).
221 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).
222 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002).
223 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
224 See Petitioner's Response Brief at 12, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct.
2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
225 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
226 For detailed information about systems such as NCIC, NLETS, MATRIX, DAVID,
TWIC and US-VISIT, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, et.
al., passim, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
227 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)
(White, J., concurring)).
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sions, says nothing about exceptions for questions about one's identity. 228 In
fact, the majority decision in Berkmeker specifically states that while an officer
may briefly detain a person and ask questions to determine his or her identity,
the detainee is not obligated to respond. 229 However, NRS 171.123 as applied
to Hiibel contradicts this premise. Hiibel was arrested because he refused to
answer an officer's question. The mere fact that the content of the question
pertained to his identity is irrelevant pursuant to Fourth Amendment case law.
Hiibel or any other person cannot be compelled to answer any questions.
Unfortunately, Hiibel did not raise the statutory vagueness argument found
in prior Fourth Amendment cases. The Hiibel majority briefly addressed
vagueness by noting that NRS 171.123 is more precise than other statutes it has
held void for vagueness, because the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the
law to require only that a suspect disclose his name, not give the officer his
driver's license or other documents. 230 However, the Hiibel majority ignored
the fact that NRS 171.123 contains nearly identical language to the California
statute the Court held unconstitutionally vague in Kolender v. Lawson.23 ' Sec-
tion 647(e) of the California Penal Code charged a person with a misdemeanor
who refused to identify himself "if the surrounding circumstances [were] such
as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identifi-
cation. 232 Similarly, NRS 171.123 refers to an officer's right to detain persons
who refuse to identify themselves "under circumstances that reasonably indi-
cate" criminal activity.233 Like section 647(e), NRS 171.123 offers little gui-
dance to officers to determine which situations require compelling
identification, thereby increasing the risk of arbitrary police enforcement. This
very concern led the Court to strike down section 647(e) in Kolender.2 34 Nev-
ertheless, even if Hiibel had argued for statutory vagueness, it appears the
Court's erroneous decision in this case would not be different.
B. The Decision is Inconsistent with Fifth Amendment Precedent.
The outcome in the Hiibel case is also at odds with the Court's Fifth
Amendment precedent. In Byers v. California, the Court listed two factors to
determine whether a compelled disclosure statute violates the privilege against
self-incrimination.235 First, the required disclosure must confront the claimant
with the substantial hazard of self-incrimination.2 36 The Court in Byers deter-
mined that the California Vehicle Code did not meet this requirement because it
did not compel information from a highly selective group inherently suspected
of committing criminal activities. 237 Furthermore, the code was essentially
228 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 n.9 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Missis-
sippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969)).
229 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
230 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.
231 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59.
232 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1970) (declared unconstitutional in Kolender, 461
U.S. at 361).
233 NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2003).
234 See Kolender, 461 U.S at 358.
235 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428-34 (1971).
236 Id. at 429.
237 Id. at 430.
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regulatory in nature.23 s In contrast, NRS 171.123 allows an officer to compel
answers from "any person ... who has committed, is committing or is about to
commit a crime. "239 This group is one inherently suspected of being engaged
in criminal activity and does not number in the millions, like the group
impacted by the California Vehicle Code. In addition, NRS 171.123 is a crimi-
nal statute, listed under Title 14, Procedure in Criminal Cases, in the Nevada
Code. 24" The intent of the statute is not to resolve civil. liabilities but to facili-
tate convictions.
Second, the Nevada statutory scheme satisfies the testimonial requirement
of Byers.241 As noted in Doe, a communication is testimonial if it explicitly or
implicitly relates a factual assertion, and most verbal statements are protected
by the Fifth Amendment.242 Disclosing one's name as required by NRS
171.123 certainly relates a factual assertion by forcing individuals to reveal
their identities to police. The obligations of the Nevada statute also subject
persons like Hiibel to the "cruel trilemma" articulated in Muniz.2 43 When Dep-
uty Dove asked Hiibel for his name, Hiibel faced the three options of the
trilemma. He could remain silent and risk arrest pursuant to the requirements
of NRS 171.123. Alternatively, Hiibel could provide a false name to Deputy
Dove and face charges of lying to an officer. Finally, Hiibel could disclose his
identity and incriminate himself. While the Hiibel majority determined that a
name "is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incrimi-
nating only in unusual circumstances," the reality is that officers can use names
to search government databases and learn personal information. 2"
The Hiibel majority also stated that knowing a suspect's identity "may
inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense" and allows an
officer "to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation,
the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim. 2
45
Thus, a name provides police with the means to learn details about an individ-
ual's background. If a name is being used to discover one's criminal past and
propensity for violence, it cannot logically follow that a name is non-incrimi-
nating. The name and its history will determine the officer's approach and
potentially prejudice his behavior toward the person detained. Furthermore, a
name may provide evidence of a relationship that could trigger the application
of domestic battery laws.24 6 In Hiibel's case, Deputy Dove received a tip that
Hiibel had hit his minor daughter.247 By revealing his name, Hiibel faced
increased penalties associated with domestic battery laws, compared to simple
238 Id.
239 NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123(1) (2003).
240 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
241 Id. at 431-32.
242 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 213 (1988).
243 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990).
244 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center, et. al., passim,
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
245 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
246 See NEV. REV. STAT. 33.018; Petitioner's Brief at 25, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554).
247 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
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battery laws.248 In sum, the requirements of NRS 171.123 violated Hiibel's
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. By holding
otherwise, the Hiibel Court set a troubling precedent for future cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court required the United States Supreme
Court to make a decision it had avoided for three decades. Unfortunately, the
Court did not seize the opportunity to declare compelled identification statutes
like NRS 171.123 unconstitutional. The Court disregarded decades of prece-
dent that suggested these laws violate the Fourth Amendment by allowing
police to make arrests on less than probable cause. Moreover, the Court gave
little consideration to the Fifth Amendment implications of a statute that com-
pels persons to reveal their names and potentially incriminate themselves. The
result of the Hiibel decision is the continued erosion of privacy rights, sacri-
ficed in the marginal hope that police may ferret out dangerous individuals in
society. Still, the Court left proponents of civil liberties with a glimmer of hope
by stating that a case could arise "in which there is a substantial allegation that
furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in
the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense." '249
If and when such a case reaches the Court, the justices should restore the rights
of persons to wander freely and anonymously.
248 Compare NEV. REV. STAT. 200.485 (2003) and NEV. REV. STAT. 200.481 (2003); see
Petitioner's Brief at 25-26, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No.
03-5554).
249 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2461.
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